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The title will be considered especially with reference to the
-grounds upon which equity requires an infringer to account for
and pay over to the complainant the gains and profits of the
infringing business.
Nothing, of course, can be added to the scholarly analysis of
the grounds of equity jurisdiction in patent causes made by Mr.
Justice Matthews in the decision of Root v. Railway, but it is to
be feared that the distinction which is there drawn, between the
position of a real trustee, accounting for his use of another's prop-
erty, and the position of an ordinary defendant, converted by a
device of equity into a fictitious trustee; accoguting for his profits
for the purpose of giving to the complainant some substitute for
damages arising from the tort, is too fine for every-day use.
In Root v. Railway, which was in effect a revision and expla-
nation of all the preceding cases bearing on the status of infringers
in courts of equity, the precise question at issue was whether an
infringer of a patent was a trustee of his gains and profits and
liable to account in equity as such trustee ; and the precise point
decided was that the infringer was not liable to account as a trus-
tee, but that, equity having taken jurisdiction for another pur-
pose, would proceed to apply to an infringer the rule adopted in
cases of trustees who have misappropriated trust funds, and
would compel the infringer to refund the profit actually realized.
That is to say, he is not a trustee, but is nevertheless within
certain limits treated as a trustee.
Among other patent causes cited by Mr. Justice Matthews as
foreshadowing the doctrine that an infringer was not a trustee, is
that of Goodyear v. Rubber Co., a case in which over three hundred
thousand dollars of defendant's profits were awarded to the com-
plainant, and the rule of ascertaining such profits was carefully
stated in the following language :
"The profits made in violation of the rights of the complainants in this
class of cases, within the meaning of the law, are to be computed and ascer-
tained by finding the difference between cost and yield. In estimating the
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-cost, the elements of price of materials, interest, expenses of manufacture and
sale, and other necessary expenditures, if any there be, and bad debts, are to
be taken into the account, and usually nothing else. The calculation is to be
made as a manufacturer calculates the profits of his business. ' Profit' is the
gain made upon any business or investment when both the receipts and pay-
ments are taken into the account."
The correctness of this rule, which, it will be observed, is
exactly in line with the doctrine of Root v. Railway, has never
been openly questioned by the Supreme Court since it was
announced. In Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S., a copyright case,
there may be traced a disposition to treat an infringer as if he
were really a trustee, or a converter of property belonging to the
complainant, but there is no suggestion that Root v. Railway and
Goodyear v. Rubber Co. are not good law.
But in the more recent case of Crosby Valve Co. v. Safety
Valve Co., 141 U. S., the court has laid down a rule for the ascer-
tainment of defendant's profits which is in direct conflict with the
Goodyear case, and is logically at variance with Root v. Railway.
In Crosby Valve Co. v. Safety Valve Co., the defendant had
sold some infringing valves at ascertained profit, but claimed the
right to set off in reduction of that profit, a loss incurred in the
manufacture of certain infringing valves which turned out to be
imperfect and were destroyed. As to this claim the court said:
"As for the contention that the destroyed valves ought to form a credit
against the profits actually realized by the defendants on the valves, it is suffi-
cient to say that the only enquiry is the profit made by the defendant on the
articles which it sold at a profit and for which it received payment, and that
losses incurred by the defendant through its wrongful invasion of the patent
are not chargeable to the plaintiff, nor can their amount be deducted from the
compensation which the plaintiff is entitled to receive."
Citing the Cawood patent, Elizabeth v. Pavement Co. and
Tilghman v. Proctor.
There may be a distinction in the calculation of profits
between articles destroyed before sale, and articles actually sold
at a loss by reason of a bad debt, but the language of the court is
wide enough to include all cases where a profit is realized on one
sale and a loss on another. For example, if the valves cost five
dollars each, and two were sold at a nominal price of eight dollars,
and the vendee, after paying for the first, but before paying for
the second, failed in business, and his estate paid only twenty-five
cents on the dollar; the account would show a profit of three dol-
lars on one sale and a loss of three dollars on the second.
According to Goodyear v. Rubber Co., which expressly states
that bad debts are to be allowed the defendant, there would be no
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profit, but according to Crosby Valve Co. v. Safety Valve Co.
there would be a profit of three dollars, to be paid over to the
complainant.
There is presented therefore a direct conflict of authority
between the rule stated in i89i by Mr. Justice Blatchford in the
following language :
"The only enquiry is the profit made by the defendant on the articles
which it sold at a profit and for which it received payment,"
and the rule stated in 1869 by Mr. Justice Swayne:
"In estimating the cost, the elements of price of materials, interest,
expenses of manufacture and sale, and other necessary expenditures, if any
there be, and bad debts, are to be taken into the account."
So far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the authorities, as
indicated above, are evenly balanced, for the precedents cited by
the court in the valve case do not touch the point, and as no ref-
erence at all was made to the Goodyear case, it would be unsafe
to treat it as overruled.
The Cawood patent, Tilghman v. Proctor, and the dictum in
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., go no further than to say that where
the use of a patented invention has resulted in an ascertained sav-
ing to the infringer, he must account for that saving even though
the whole result of his business at large was a net loss. In those
cases the savings referred to were calculated as the net result of
the whole infringement, and there was no suggestion that one dis-
advantageous infringing act should be set off against another
advantageous infringing act of the defendant.
In the Circuit Court, the first appearance of the Valve case
doctrine was in Graham v. Mason, 5th Fisher, 290, 1872. That
case presented no question of setting off a profitable sale against
an unprofitable one, but judge Shepley nevertheless stated animaginary case of that sort, and announced his belief that no such
right of set-off existed, because such a right would be unjust to
the patentee.
This was in flat contradictiou of Goodyear v. Rubber Co., and
being purely obiter also, the case can hardly be said to be an
authority on the point in question. Moreover, judge Shepley
was unfortunate in the grounds on which he based this belief, for
he reasons from the assumption that if the patentee had known
beforehand exactly what sales had been profitable he might have
declared on these alone in his bill, and have ignored the others;
but in reality such a bill would be demurrable under Root v.
Railway, and so the learned Judge's argument might be turned.
against himself, if it were worth while.
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There is, however, one case- Steam Stone Cutter Co. v.
Windron Mfg. Co. (1879), 17 Blatch. 24, in which the doctrine
that only profitable sales are to be taken into the account is defi-
nitely laid down and applied by Judge Wheeler. The opinion
assumes the right of the complainant to follow up each sale sepa-
rately and take the proceeds thereof without reference to the rest,
and illustrates the proposition by saying that the sale of the pat-
ented improvement in connection with the defendant's machine
"is the same as if anything else belonging to the orator had been
put into and sold with the machines, and the orator claimed what
that had brought."
In aiming at the conclusion stated, the court makes two
assumptions ; first that a patentee, complainant in equity, has a
right to follow each infringement separately, which is a question
hereafter discussed; and second, that the sale of a patented
device is. comparable to the sale of a chattel belonging to the
patentee.
The latter proposition opens up the vexed question of the
exact nature of the property evidenced by letters patent, and
without undertaking to discuss the question at large, it is enough
to point out, in answer to Judge Wheeler's argument, that the
patent certainly does not purport to give title to the concrete
article claimed, but only a temporary monopoly of making, using
and selling it.
For example, if one acquires by purchase an infringing article,
the mere possession of the article by the vendee is not of itself an
infringement of the patent; in such case the vendee owns the
infringing article for some purposes, and may exercise many acts
of ownership and control over it, even to the point of destroying
it, but until he uses it or sells it he does not interfere with any
right of property belonging to the patentee; and if the vendee
chooses to lay the infringing article aside until the patent expires,
he then owns it for all purposes.*
This is enough to show that the property evidenced by a
patent is not the legal title to, or the right of possession of any
infringing article.
* There are authorities for the proposition that the chancellor may order
the defendant to deliver up the infringing machine to be destroyed or to be
purchased by the patentee at the cost of materials ; but this is a matter of
discretion with the Court and not matter of right with the patentee-see
Needham v. Oxley, 8 Law Tines 604 ;- and it proceeds, no doubt, on the
theory that equity having power to enjoin the infringement, will, in a suitable
case, insure obedience to the injunction by making a continuance of the
infringement impossible.
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It follows that the patentee could not maintain an action of
replevin to recover infringing articles (honestly acquired) from
one who was using them in violation of the patent. By parity of
reasoning, he could not maintain trover for the conversion of the
chattel against one who sold the infringing article; but could
only recover damages as in trespass for the unlawful acts of use
or sale done by the infringer.
This may be made clearer by a recollection of the fact that the
manufacture and sale of an article by an infringer does not
deprive the patentee of any concrete thing, or take away anything
from him. It may lose him the sale of an article which he would
otherwise have sold, but that loss is an incident of a special situ-
ation in trade and not a necessary result of the infringement.
In other words it is true, both in law and in fact, that the sale
of a patented article is not, as Judge Wheeler assumes, like the
conversion of a chattel belonging to the patentee,.but is a naked
infraction of the exclusive right to sell the patented article, which
may or may not actually damage the patentee.
It is a tort, but not a conversion or witholding of any concrete
thing.
The distinction is a nice one, and it is the more difficult to
make because courts are continually drawing analogies in its
explanation which serve the particular purpose well enough, but
remain to confuse and mislead the next comer. Root v. Railway,
cleared up and swept away a mass of phrases in which the defend-
ant had been styled a "trustee," and although the Supreme
Court has not yet had occasion to perform, for the benefit of the
profession, a like task in defining the exact character of the prop-
erty granted by a patent, it is at least evident that the grant is of
some kind of an incorporeal right, and not of title to any concrete
thing.
It may therefore be affirmed with reasonable certainty that an
infringer is not a trustee, and that he is not chargeable with the
consequences of wrongfully converting to his own use the concrete
infringing articles which he sells.
Upon what theory, then, is the infringer made to account for
profits in a proceeding in equity?
It cannot be that equity will for any purpose convert a simple
tort feasor into a trustee, and charge him with obligations which
it is admitted that he has not assumed. Neither is there any
reason for so doing, for the plaintiff's proper and legally sufficient
pecuniary remedy for the tort is damages; and a court of equity
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will not establish a harsher rule for one class of tort feasors than
another. Although, as stated in Root v. Railway, a court of
equity, having once taken jurisdiction for another purpose, may
apply the rule by which it compels trustees to disgorge the fruits
of their unlawful use of trust property, it must in common justice
apply the rule with reference to the fact that in the case of an
infringer there has been no betrayal of a trust, and that there is
in fact no trust fund. The theory of Root v. Railway is in fact
too subtle and too easily misunderstood, and Mr. Justice Swayne,
in the Goodyear case, seems to have stated the only tenable
ground for holding the infringer to account, when he put it on the
broad equitable principle that "the controlling consideration is
that he shall not profit by his own wrong."
This relieves the case of any necessity for pretending that the
defendant is a trustee when in fact he is not, or for assuming the
illogical position that, though the plaintiff has no title to the prop-
erty sold, he has title to the proceeds of the sale. It treats the
profits as legally belonging to the defendants, but takes them
from the defendant on the well-recognized principle that no man
shall profit by his wrong, and gives them to the defendant in lieu
of damages, on the equally well-recognized principle of prevent-
ing a multiplicity of suits.*
If this view be as correct as it seems reasonable, it does away
with all fine-spun distinctions between actual and quasi trustees,
and fixes the status of an infringer accounting in equity consis-
tently as that of a simple tort feasor, who has fallen into the
hands of equity collaterally.
It also resolves the conflict of authority between the Goodyear
case and the Valve case in favor of the older doctrine ; for if the
defendant be simply a tort feasor, and his gains are to be taken
from him simply that he may not profit by the tort, then he
is clearly entitled in equity to the ordinary application of the
rule of equitable set-off, in ascertaining the existence and extent
of his gains.
As Mr. Justice Swayne puts it:
,1 The c-iculation is to be made as a manufacturer calculates the profits of
his business."
* The statute, it is true, has of late years given authority to courts of
equity to assess damages directly in patent causes, but this fact does not alter
the theory upon which the same courts still exercise their original equitable
jurisdiction in compelling the infringer to account.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
It still remains, in order to remove a remaining uncertainty,
to inquire whether the complainant in equity may not neverthe-
less treat each separate infringement as a separate tort, and col-
lect damages, or defendant's profits in lieu of damages, on each
separate tort as a separate cause of action.
The answer to this suggestion is two-fold: that there is but one
cause of action stated in the bill, and not a number of separate
causes of action ; and that, although each infringing act is techni-
cally a separate tort, the complainant has elected, for the sake of
obtaining an injunction, to aggregate all the defendant's torts in
one proceeding.
Having done this, he cannot take out of the hands of equity
the adjustment of any one specific tort. This was expressly
decided in Morss v. Knapp, 45 Fed. Rep. 199, where an injunc-
tion was issued restraining a complainant in equity from bringing
a suit at law against the defendant for infringements of the
patent, committed after the filing of the interlocutory degree, but
before the coming in of the Master's report. And this case pro-
ceeded on the recognized principle that a plaintiff in equity is
bound to submit to equity each and every controversy with the
defendant of which the court can take jurisdiction under the orig-
inal bill.
It seems, therefore, that the complainant should have no right
to interfere between the court and the defendant to say what
items the Master should take into the account in ascertaining the
existence and extent of defendant's profits.
Judge Shepley thought that the right of the defendant to set
off losses in reduction of profits was unjust to the complainant;
but this presupposes that the complainant has some equitable
right of property in the defendant's profits, which, (if Root v.
Railway be good authority,) is as untrue in law as it seems to be
in logic.
Literally speaking, the complainant, in common with other
injured parties, is entitled to his actual damages and nothing
more, and in the contemplation of equity, which awards the
defendant's profits, in lieu of damages, these profits are presuma-
bly not intended to be greater than the actual damages, instead of
which they are given. Moreover, under the present statute
actual damages may be awarded in excess of defendant's profits.
The complainant in equity has, therefore, two measures of
damages, between which he may elect; the ordinary and legally
sufficient measure of actual loss, which compensates him for the
112
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injury sustained from the defendant's tort, and the extraordinary
equitable measure of the defendant's profits, which do not belong
to the complainant because they are profits, but are given to him
under an equitable fiction as damages, and are also intended sim-
ply to compensate for the injury actually sustained from the
defendant's tort, and are not given with any view of punishing the
defendant.
If the defendant's profits, when ascertained, exceed the actual
damage which the complainant has in fact suffered from the
infringement, he is more than compensated. If the defendant's
profits, when ascertained, fall below the actual damages sustained,
the complainant is at liberty to prove and collect the amount of
actual damage in excess of the defendant's profits.
In either event he is at least compensated for his actual injury
as fully as the law intends to compensate an injured party ; and it
is therefore no injustice to allow the defendant to reduce his profit
by setting off bad debts and other unprofitable sales, because the
complainant still retains the ordinary right to recover his actual
damages.
It will be suggested that equity intends to give more ample
compensation than the rule of legal damage affords; but that is
ordinarily the result of the jurisdictional fact of a betrayal of trust
or confidence, or of a special inadequacy of the legal remedy.
In ordinary patent causes the sole inadequacy of the law is
cured by the issue of the injunction, after which, in the strictness
of chancery practice, the patentee would then be remitted to his
action at law for damage; and the fact that equity retains the
cause to prevent a multiplicity of suits is not a jurisdictional fact
which justifies any greater tenderness to the patentee or any
greater hardship to the infringer than either would receive at the
hands of a court of law.
The equitable rule that no man shall profit by his wrong is
fully satisfied by ascertaining the real profit "as a manufacturer
calculates the profits of the business" ; and the contrary doctrine
of the Valve case can only be upheld on the apparently erroneous
assumption that whenever any profit, however temporary, appears,
it belongs of right and because it is a "profit" to the patentee.
As the court said in Root v. Railway, in commenting on the
claim that the infringer was a trustee for the patentee in respect
to profits :
I IThat would be a reductio ad absurdum, and, if accepted, would extend
the jurisdiction of equity to every case of tort, where the wrong-doer received
a pecuniary profit from his wrong."
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In conclusion, it may be said that as the property in patent
rights is sui generis, the attempt to apply the ordinary rules of law
and equity is necessarily difficult. It is certain that at present
the whole subject of recovery for infringement is in an unsatisfac-
tory condition, and that some other rule of compensation than
that of recovering damages in the guise of defendant's profits
ought to be adopted.
For instance, if the patentee has not gone into the market at
all, he may nevertheless recover large profits from an infringer
who has been at the risk of building up his business and has done
it so successfully as actually to benefit the patentee by creating a
market for the patented article. On the other hand, from another
infringer, whose business has been unprofitable, the same pat-
entee may collect nothing. Thus, though the tort is the same,
and the actual damage nil, the patentee collects profits which
may have been wholly due to a superior business capacity on the
part of the one infringer, while the other goes free, simply
because he is less intelligent.
The equitable rule that no one shall profit by his own wrong
fails in patent causes to do substantial justice to a defendant,
because success in trade depends more on the personality of the
tradesman than on the goods in which he deals; and from
another standpoint it seems clear that if the patentee is to receive
compensation for the defendant's use of the invention, irrespective
of actual damages, his title to such compensation ought to be
based on some calculation of the value of the invention, and not
to depend on the good or bad fortune of the defendant who uses
it.
This rule has often been followed in cases where the patentee
has himself put a value on his invention by exacting a uniform
royalty or license fee for its use ; and it ought not to be impossi-
ble for a court of equity to ascertain from suitable proofs what
would be a fair royalty for the use of the invention in controversy,
and thus to apply a measure of damage which would be compen-
satory to the complainant as against all defendants, and which at
the same time might allow a defendant who had realized an extra-
ordinary profit by the exercise of uncommon business skill to
retain a portion of the fruits of his sagacity.
This suggestion is perhaps wide of the mark at which this
paper is aimed, and for the present it is more essential that exist-
ing rules should be made consistent, than that new ones should be
suggested.
